U.S. Foreign Policy, the U.S.-China-Taiwan Triangle, and Public Opinion in Taiwan: Results of the 2022 "American Portrait" Survey－Press Release

The survey was conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chencghi University from November 15 to 20, 2022, via telephone interviews with 1234 Taiwanese adults, with sampling error margins of ±2.79 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence interval. 

Summary of the main findings

Evaluation of US-Taiwan-China Relations

• US Support vs. China Threat: Almost 58% believed that U.S. support for Taiwan's security had increased in recent years, and 83% believed that the threat from the PRC had increased in recent years.
• Evaluation on democracy in the US and China: On a scale of 1-10 (with 1 being least democratic and 10 being most democratic), over 60% of respondents rated U.S. democracy as 7 or above, in contrast to just 2.8% for the PRC.
• Polarization on the credibility of the United States: when asked if the United States was trustworthy, around 34% said yes while around 56% said no.
• Very little belief in the credibility of the PRC: only around 9% said that the PRC was a trustworthy country.
• Skepticism about the narrative of American decline: Only about 30% believe that Beijing's power will surpass that of the United States in the next 10 years

Evaluation of US Policies toward Taiwan

• Accurate understanding of U.S. policy: over 50% of respondents correctly identified the U.S. position on Taiwan's sovereignty as undetermined.
• Strong support for U.S. arms sales: over 60% of respondents expressed support for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
• Respondents believe in presidential assurances: 62% of respondents said that a president's pledge to deploy U.S. forces to Taiwan would increase their belief in the likelihood of U.S. intervention in Taiwan's defense
• High-level U.S. visits send a strong signal to Taiwan: around 60% of respondents said that visits of high-level U.S. officials to Taiwan increase their belief in the likelihood of U.S. intervention in Taiwan's defense
• Strong support for the status quo: less than 6% expressed support for immediate changes to the status quo. 42% - the highest figure of any category – believed that Taiwan should maintain relations with the United States at the current level – and a similar percentage believed that Taiwan should maintain relations with the PRC at the current level.
• Perceived Likelihood of US intervention in the Taiwan Strait
• 57% of respondents believe that the United States will intervene in Taiwan's defense if Beijing tries to unilaterally change the status quo
• 43% of respondents believe that the United States will intervene in Taiwan's defense even if Taiwan tries to unilaterally change the status quo

James Lee: Evidence Does Not Support the "Dual Deterrence" Argument for Strategic Ambiguity

The dispute over Taiwan has been at the forefront of geopolitics. With tensions between Washington and Beijing reaching levels not seen since the Cold War, there has been heightened concern that great power competition could escalate to great power conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the coming years. The most controversial aspect of U.S. policy is "strategic ambiguity," under which the United States does not say if, or under what conditions, it would intervene in the defense of Taiwan. One of the arguments defending strategic ambiguity rests on the concept of "dual deterrence."[1] According to this view, the lack of a clear U.S. commitment to Taiwan's defense deters Taiwan from unilaterally changing the status quo: because Taiwan is not certain about U.S. support, it is less likely to take actions that would trigger Beijing to use force. This argument rests on a number of key assumptions about the preferences of Taiwan's voters and how they perceive the conditions in U.S. policy. The American Portrait Survey, sponsored by the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica, has produced findings that challenge the conventional wisdom.

The survey results show that as many as 43% of respondents believe that the United States will intervene in Taiwan's defense even if Taiwan tries to unilaterally change the status quo. And yet there is still strong support for the status quo, with only around 6% favoring any immediate changes. Considered together, these findings suggest that it is not accurate to characterize U.S. strategic ambiguity as a deterrent against a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan. Rather, Taiwan itself is a stakeholder in the status quo, even though a significant proportion of the public considers U.S. support to be unconditional. This finding challenges the assumptions behind the "dual deterrence" argument. While there are other arguments in favor of strategic ambiguity, "dual deterrence" is based on an inaccurate understanding of the views of Taiwan's public on sovereignty and relations with the United States.

For more details on the survey results, please refer to the following report: https://www.dropbox.com/s/hil8gy0o2xxz57b/AP_W2_Report.pdf?

The questionnaire design for this project was carried out by Hsin-Hsin Pan, Chien-Huei Wu, and Wen-Chin Wu, and this paper was written by James Lee, the convener of the "U.S.-Taiwan-China Relations Project" at the Institute of European and American Studies (IEEE).