2023 Survey Results of the “American Portrait”－Press Release

Initiated in 2021 by Dr. Chien-Huei Wu (the-then convenor of the U.S.-Taiwan-China Relations Thematic Research Group in the Institute of European and American Studies, IEAS, Academia Sinica) in collaboration with Dr. James Lee (IEAS, Academia Sinica), Dr. Wen-Chin Wu (IPSAS, Academia Sinica) and Dr. Hsin-Hsin Pan (Department of Sociology, Soochow University), "American Portrait" Project is a Taiwan-based survey that investigates the public's perception of the United States and China and evaluates the development of U.S.-Taiwan-China Relations in order to understand the impact of the United States' Taiwan Policy toward Taiwan's public opinion.

The third wave of the survey, funded by IEAS, Academia Sinica, was carried out by the Election Study Center at National Chencghi University from September 14 to 19, 2023, via telephone interviews with 1,211 Taiwanese adults, with sampling error margins of ±2.82 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence interval.

Summary of The Main Findings

Evaluation of US-Taiwan-China Relations

• Polarization on the credibility of the United States: 33.9% of the people agreed that the U.S. was a trustworthy country while 55.3% disagreed.
• Very little belief in the credibility of China: only 9.3% of people agreed that China was a trustworthy country while 55.3% disagreed.
• Evaluation on democracy in the US and China: On a scale of 1-10 (with 1 being least democratic and 10 being most democratic), around 61.2% of respondents rated U.S. democracy as 7 or above, in contrast to just 2.8% for China.

Effectiveness of US Security Commitment

• US Support vs. China Threat: 55.7% believed that U.S. support for Taiwan's security had increased in recent years, and 82.7% believed that the threat from China had increased in recent years.
• Majority supports US arms sales to Taiwan: 65.9% of respondents expressed support for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
• Respondents believe in presidential assurances: 65.4% of people said that a president's public commitment to defend Taiwan would increase their belief in the likelihood of U.S. using force to help Taiwan.
• High-level U.S. visits send a strong signal to Taiwan: 59.6% of respondents said that visits of high-level U.S. officials to Taiwan increase their belief in the likelihood of U.S. using force to help Taiwan.
• U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are better than donating weapons: more than half of people (54.5%) agreed that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan increase their belief in the likelihood of U.S. using force to help Taiwan; if it donated weapons to Taiwan, 47.3% of the people agreed.

• Taiwanese people believed that US military actions will increase Taiwan's security: 66.4% believed that if U.S. military aircraft and warships patrol Taiwan routinely, it will increase the likelihood of U.S. using force to help Taiwan.
• Confidence in United States' Taiwan Policy: U.S. military aircraft and warships patrol Taiwan routinely (66.4%), U.S. president's public commitment to defend Taiwan (65.4%), high-level U.S. visits (59.6%), U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (54.5%), U.S. donation of weapons (47.3%)

Economic and National Security of Taiwan

• Slight decrease in the evaluation of the economic impact of the US: 54.1% believed that the impact of the United States on Taiwan's economic development is positive (lower than 57.5% in 2022) while 32.3% believed it is negative (higher than 57.5% in 2022).
• Signing agreements promote national security: 40% of the respondents agreed with the positive impact on Taiwan's national security of signing the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade while 22.7% disagreed.
• Polarization on the connection between TSMC and US security commitments:when asked whether TSMC's importance for the United States makes it more likely that the U.S. will use force to help Taiwan if China attacks, 47.9% agreed while 44.6% disagreed; also, regarding whether TSMC's establishment of new fabs in the United States will reduce the possibility of the United States using force to help Taiwan, more than half (50.9%) of the people said no, and 38.7% said yes.
• Extending military service strengthens Taiwan's security:63.5% expressed that the extension of the military service can strengthen Taiwan's security; 48.7% believed the military service should be extended to 1-2 years.

Taiwanese People's Perception of the Status Quo—Perceived Likelihood of US Intervention in the Taiwan Strait

• Strong support for the status quo:the majority of people (91.4%) expressed support for maintaining the status quo.
• Transition of the Taiwan Identity: 78.4% expressed that Taiwan and China do not belong to the same country, and over half of people considered that Taiwan's current country name is The Republic of China (36.5%) or The Republic of China (Taiwan) (21.1%); in addition, 62.5% considered themselves Taiwanese, 2.3% were Chinese, and 32.2% were both.
• 57.9% of respondents believe that the United States will use force to help Taiwan if Beijing tries to unilaterally change the status quo while 32.8% believe it will not (which includes both "will not" and "definitely will not").
• 41.6% of respondents believe that the United States will use force to help Taiwan even if Taiwan tries to unilaterally change the status quo while 47% believe it will not (include: will not/definitely will not).

With tensions between Washington and Beijing at their highest since the Cold War, there are growing concerns that competition between the two could escalate in the coming years, further triggering a conflict between the great powers in the Taiwan Strait. Experts have different views on whether the United States' cross-Strait policies can effectively deter China from invading Taiwan and discourage Taiwan from pursuing de jure international legal recognition. In particular, some controversial measures, such as statements targeting "strategic clarity," suggestions to rename Taiwan's office in the United States, invitations to Taiwan to participate in the RIM of the Pacific Exercises, and U.S. high-level visits, have caused more controversy. Although much of the policy debate often centers on China's reaction to the United States' cross-Strait policies, it is equally crucial to take into account Taiwan's impression of the U.S. as well as how it receives and reacts to signals from the United States.

Mixed Views on the Silicon Shield: Deviation Between the Reality and the Viewpoints

Many Taiwanese people called TSMC the "magic mountain that protects the nation," (護國神山） believing that the chips it produces are indispensable to the world, so it can protect Taiwan from war and avoid global economic turmoil. However, according to the survey results, 44.6% agreed (while 47.9% disagreed) that the TSMC's importance for the United States makes it more likely that the U.S. will use force to help Taiwan. In contrast, regarding TSMC's establishment of new fabs in the United States, 38.7% agreed (while 50.9% disagreed) it would reduce the likelihood of the United States using force to help Taiwan. From the perspective of the Taiwanese people, TSMC is not the main consideration in whether the United States would use force to help Taiwan. When we cross-compared these two questions with party identification, we found that party identification has a more direct impact on people's belief that the United States will use force to help Taiwan. Compared with those who support other political parties, supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are more likely to agree that " TSMC's importance for the United States makes it more likely that the U.S. will use force to help Taiwan if China attacks" while supporters of the Kuomintang (KMT) are more likely to disagree. Compared with those who identify with other political parties, supporters of the KMT were more likely to agree that " If TSMC sets up new fabs in the United States, the U.S. will be less likely to use force to help Taiwan if China attacks," while supporters of the DPP were more likely to disagree.

Confidence in United States' Taiwan Security Policy

When evaluating different United States' Taiwan policies, such as U.S. military aircraft and warships patrolling Taiwan routinely, the U.S. president's public commitment, high-level U.S. visits, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. donation of weapons, Taiwanese people have different viewpoints on whether the U.S. will use force to help Taiwan. People believed that U.S. military aircraft and warships patrolling Taiwan routinely were the most helpful in increasing the likelihood that the US would use force to help Taiwan in the future. Comparatively, the U.S. donation of weapons has the lowest level of confidence, with only 47.3% of people believing it to be a credible security commitment. Out of the five U.S. policies regarding Taiwan, this particular one receives less than half of the approval.

Comparing the first wave (2021) and the second wave (2022) of the American Portrait Project Survey, it shows that Taiwanese people's trust in the United States has decreased (from 45.3% to 34%), but comparing the second wave with the third wave (2023) shows that Taiwanese people's trust in the United States has not changed significantly during this period (from 34% to 33.9%).

A comparison of the results of Wave 2 and Wave 3 reveals a noteworthy discrepancy: although U.S. assurances have the intended signaling effect among respondents, perceptions of U.S. credibility have not changed substantially in spite of the consistent U.S. signals over the intervening year (e.g., U.S. and Canadian warships passing through the Taiwan Strait to conduct the military exercise in South China Sea & transit diplomacy). There are two plausible interpretations of this discrepancy. One is that the signals are simply not reaching the public, which may be due to a lack of extensive coverage in the media or some other limitation of public diplomacy. The other interpretation is that the belief in U.S. intervention is substantially different from the general belief in U.S. credibility, and hence the United States may be more likely to intervene even if its underlying credibility does not change. The results of Wave 3 do not offer a conclusive explanation for this discrepancy, which suggests that future waves of the study should include further questions to assess what the concept of "credibility" means to respondents in Taiwan, and to assess how aware they are of the actual U.S. assurances beyond the hypothetical "U.S. commitment" presented.

However, the fluctuations in credibility in the United States do not reflect anti-American sentiment or a generally negative view of the United States: when asked to rate our country's relationship with the United States on a scale of 0 to 10, only 8.6% of the public considered the relationship to be hostile; when asked to rate the U.S. democratic system from 0 to 10 (with 1 being least democratic and 10 being most democratic), 61.2% of people rated U.S. democracy as 7 or above; 55.7% believed that the United States has increased its security guarantees for Taiwan in recent years; 54.1% believed that the United States has had a positive impact on Taiwan's economy in recent years.